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Global media and violence
in Africa: The case of Somalia
Jan-Bart Gewald
It has been argited that Africa has been sidelined in the global
ICT revolution and that African societies appear to be cut off
from global flows of Information. Nevertheless, the manner in
which war was waged in Somalia between 1991 and 1994
indicates that this global revolution has affected the manner in
which war has come to be waged in Africa. African societies
may indeed be cut off from owning and controlling the streams
of images that reflect their continent, but they may, however, at
times come to temporarily hijack and divert this stream of
images, and ensure that images that support or reinforce their
political aims come to be released into the global flow. In the
case of Somalia, the real-time images ofdead US soldiers being
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu were sufficient to
make the United States end their involvement in Somalia.
Introduction
Any form of good scholarship dealing with Africa would of necessity place
African societies within the context of the wider and thus global world. The
bulk of material dealing with Africa in the context of globalization has been
dominated by economie studies, many of which fail to take cognisance of, let
alone deal with, the social or cultural aspects of globalization. Fortunately, there
is also a substantial amount of literature within the social sciences that deals
with Africa in the context of globalization. Unfortunately some of this literature
is esoteric, and thus generally unintelligible to the majority of readers, or
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anecdotal in the extreme.' It is often forgotten that anecdotes, though they may
lead to complementary head-nodding and exclamations from admiring academie
audiences, do not in themselves explain why events are taking place. Thus
descriptions of Somali or Liberian gunmen bearing their arms in ways copied
from US television shows may be interesting but do not explain why these men
are taking up arms in the first place.2 Wars in Africa cannot be adequately
explained merely through reference to fashion. This is not to deny that styles
and images may influence the manner in which wars are fought. In his work on
northern Tanzania, Brad Weiss explicitly states that his focus is on the interplay
of 'the imaginary' and 'the global', and it is in dealing with imagination that hè
makes the following tantalizing remarks:
Far from (simply) an indulgence in escapist and illusory delusions, imaginative
practice becomes essential to the very defmition of reality as it is perceived and
encountered. Conceived of in this way, fantasy becomes a medium through which to
pursue the concrete processes by which consciousness is engaged in the world. A
further insistence of many who address 'the imagination' is the recognition that such
practices include far more man liberatory exercises in boundless, cultural creativity.
Our interests in the imagination must incorporate the fantasies of ethnic cleansing
and other brutalities as well as educational aspirations, regimes of mass
consumption as well as utopian visions of democratie reform (Weiss 2001: 5,
emphasis added).
In other words, imagination does not only include the pleasing and desired
aspects of life, but can also just as often come to include the darker side of life,
fantasies that include the hurt and destruction of others. However, ideas and
fantasies in and of themselves are not sufficient explanation as to why violence
should occur.1 This is well presented by Clapham (2001) who, in dealing with
developments in Sierra Leone, readily refers to aspects of a globalized populär
culture in seeking to explain aspects of violence:
1
 To be sure there could be those who would wish to argue that there is no need for
academie literature to be intelligible to the majority of readers. However, I do believe
that the role of the academie is to seek to explain the world, and to do so in ways that
are easily accessible to as large a group of people as possible.
2
 For an extreme example of this soit of material, see Amina Mama (2001), 'Gender in
Action: Militarism and War' at: http://www.uct.ac.za/org/agi/papers/military.htm.
For an overview of some of these perceptions to be found in the populär media, see
Ottosen (1994) and Kennedy (1993).
3
 Regarding the human mind, evil imagination and destructiveness, interested readers
may wish to see Erich Fromm (1973) The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
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The products of an alienated American youth culture, notably the Rambo film 'First
Blood' and gangster rap music, were readily reinterpreted in local terms as
symbolising and legitimising resistance against a repressive official structure.
(Clapham2001)4
Equally disturbing to the work that seeks to explain violence in terms of
fashion, is that of the widely read and respected American commentator, Robert
Kaplan (2001), who writes:
As anybody who has had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, 'technicals' in
Somalia, Tontons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can teil you, in
places where Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always
been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence. ... worrying about mines and
ambushes frees you from worrying about mundane details of daily existence.1
For Kaplan, isolated Africa has not attained a 'certain economie, educational,
and cultural Standard' that would 'tranquillize' physical aggression that hè sees
as a part of being human. In other words, African primitives need to be civilized
and, until this occurs, wars and violence will be the natural way of things in
Africa.
There is a burgeoning literature that shows that the wars being fought out
across the length and breadth of Africa are intimately connected to international
global flows of weapons, drugs, diamonds and other trades. The work of
Christopher Clapham, Stephen Ellis and Paul Richards on the wars in Sierra
Leone and Liberia provide insight into the manner in which these wars take
place within a global setting in which Africa is not an isolate. The genocide
committed in Rwanda, and the subsequent Congolese wars, took place within a
global context in which ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity could be
imagined — a context in which horrific examples of success are accessible and
available to allow the imagined successful implementation of similar crimes
against humanity. Yet to describe the violence committed in Rwanda, as the
high priest of globalization studies Arjun Appadurai (1998: 905) does, as a
vivisection of the body politie is assuredly poetic but far from explanatory.
... bodily violence may be viewed as a form of vivisection, and as an effort to
resolve unacceptable levels of uncertamty through bodily deconstruction. This
approach may cast light on the surplus of rage displayed in many recent episodes of
inter-group violence. ... such extreme and intimate violence may partly lie in the
4
 http://www.ippu.purdue.edu/failed_states/2001/papers/CLAPHAM2.pdf
1
 Kaplan's view of Sierra Leone is countered by Richards (1996).
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deformation of national and local spaces of everyday life by the physical and moral
pressures of globalization.'
It is generally accepted that the process of globalization has been in progress for
decades, if not centuries. What is truly new in the last twenty years though has
been the introduction of the electronic ability to compress space and time in a
manner that is accessible to the majority of people on earth.7 The major
difference with the past is the amount of information and the speed with which
both information and real-time images can be transferred from one point on the
globe to another. In the whole globalization discussion, it is this issue of space-
time compression that is the most important for our work. Having said this, it is
necessary that examples as to how space-time compression has affected
violence in Africa be presented. How has space-time compression qualitatively
changed violence in Africa?8 An example of violent conflict in Africa is
examined here and the role of space-time compression discussed therein. It is in
effect an argument about a specific form of space-time compression, namely the
local and highly contested use and appropriation of features of the global spread
of mass media and mass communication.'
Globalization and Iraq
In 1991 Peter Arnett, CNN's reporter-at-large, became the face and voice of the
world's first globalized war. Standing on the roof of the Intercontinental Hotel
in downtown Baghdad, Arnett covered the first air raids of the American-led
Allied forces against Iraq. Television viewers around the world saw Operation
Desert Storm unfold. At 3 a.m. in Baghdad, l a.m. in Amsterdam, and the
6
 See also Appadurai (1998: 906) 'Yet, to my knowledge, no single work has sought to
explore the precise ways in which the ethnic body can be a theatre for the engagement
of uncertainty under the special circumstances of globalisation'.
7
 Certainly telegraph and later telephone and even later wireless have been available
from the 1860s onwards, but only for a limited audience and only within specific
settings. The major transformation is the availability of real time mass-media images
and mass communication.
8
 It has been in seeking to deal with the impact of globalization on Africa that the entire
WOTRO globalization project was established in 1994.
9
 In his discussion of the information age, specifically in relation to questions of
ownership, Castells (1997: 309-352) argues that the media, or rather access to media,
has become the essential domain for politics. In this domain the most important issue is
the (visual) image that puts a specific message across. In this struggle for images the
most effective political message to be found is the image that conveys a negative
message. Politics has, according to Castells, become the domain of images of spin.
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beginning of prime time, 5 p.m. Eastern Standard Time in New York, anti-
aircraft fire streamed through the air, the streaks of tracer bullets clearly visible
on television screens around the world. Surface-to-air missiles rocketed into the
sky, their thunderous blue-to-orange exhaust trails sporadically dominating
television images. Approximately half an hour after the anti-aircraft barrage had
begun, the first incoming cruise missiles and other ordinance launched miles
away began exploding in and around Baghdad. Explosions lit up the Baghdad
skyline, and seconds later the rumbling sound of the same explosions reached
Peter Arnett and his CNN news crew standing on the hotel rooftop in the centre
of Baghdad."1
Drinking bourbon and nibbling anchovies, I, along with the rest of the
modern world, watched on TV the opening stages of the world's first truly
globalized media war. For 17 hours, thanks to the services of CNN and Peter
Arnett, the world could see, live before their very own eyes, the unfolding of an
allegedly new era of warfare, in which media, smart bombs and the near total
absence of Allied casualties on the Alliance's side were the order of the day.
This did not mean that there was no carnage." As the war progressed, Alliance
forces killed tens of thousands of Iraqi conscripts. Iraqi soldiers came to be
buried in their trenches by American bulldozers, Iraqi troops and Iraqi and
Palestinian refugees fleeing Kuwait were strafed and killed,12 and the world's
largest conventional ordinance, euphemistically known as the 'daisy cutter',11
was dropped on Iraqi positions. For all its extensive media coverage, this, the
seedier reality of war, was not transmitted to the world's television audiences.
Instead, they were presented with what became known as the 'Incubator Scam'.
10
 Peter Arnett no longer works for CNN but those interested can contact him directly
via his personal website: http://www.peterarnett.com/
11
 For an excellent first-hand view of the Gulf War by an American marine, see
Swofford (2003).
'We fire and fire the AKs, a factory of firepower, the fierce scream of metal downrange
and discharged cartridges and sand flying everywhere, now all of us shooting in the air,
shooting straight up and dancing in circles, dancing on one foot, with the mad, desperate
hope that the rounds will never descend, screaming, screaming at ourselves and each
other and the dead Iraqis surrounding us, screaming at ourselves and the dead world
surrounding us, screaming at ourselves, at the corpses surrounding us and the dead
world. . . . And I know we'll soon carry that mad scream home with us, but that no one
will listen because they'll want to hear the crowd-roar of victory.'
12
 For a report on the 'Highway of Death', see URL: http://deoxy.org/warcrime.htm.
This site contains a report compiled by Ramsey Clark who served as Attorney-General
in the Johnson administration. Clark was convenor of the Commission of Inquiry for the
International War Crimes Tribunal that presented the report in New York on 11 May
1991.
13
 For technical details and gung-ho views on the 'daisy cutter', see:
http://www.fas.org/man/dodl01/sys/dumb/blu-82.htm.
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In it, the audience of the US television programme Sixty Minutes was presented
with a bereft and distraught Kuwaiti nurse who stated that she had personally
witnessed Iraqi troops throw new-born babies out of incubators in a hospital in
Kuwait City. It was only later that this turned out to be a propaganda hoax, and
the nurse none other than the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United
States.u
It is a truism, but the first casualty in war is indeed the truth. However, it has
also been said that reality is what you can get away with. From the very
beginning, the Gulf War was the mother of all media wars. Every evening for
the duration of Operation Desert Storm, Allied commanders presented the world
with clinically clean videogame images of missiles thudding into buildings and
bunkers — and never any bodies. Norman Schwarzkopf, Colin Powell and
others gloated at the Iraqi driver who failed to look in his rear-view mirror.
Live, real time, in our living rooms, bars and workplaces, we watched
beleaguered Israeli citizens collecting government-issued gas masks and sealing
their apartments against imminent Iraqi attacks. American Patriot missiles
rocketed into the night sky above Tel Aviv and allegedly intercepted incoming
scuds, whilst crack British SAS teams sought out and destroyed mobile scud
launch sites in Iraq. But, was it the truth? When Peter Arnett, now a well-known
name, reported on the bombing and destruction of a baby-milk factory in a US
bombing raid, CNN was put under pressure to ditch him." When journalists
began reporting on the Highway of Death, the war was over, and nobody
wished to entertain the Suggestion that Alliance soldiers could ever have
committed war crimes."1
The Gulf War, which ended with American forces being feted in a ticker-
tape parade through New York City, was — from the beginning to the end — a
global media event." Live, the citizens of the world could see how the United
States overcame its Vietnam syndrome and pounded home the truth that
henceforth the United States of America was the Lone Ranger, the sole
superpower answerable to none.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, American military strategists, when
analysing their total and devastating victory, took on board the concept of the
'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), otherwise known as the 'Military
Technical Revolution' (MTR). RMA is a concept that, interestingly enough,
14
 For a report on this fabrication and others like it, see http://www.fair.org.
15
 In 1995, when Arnett returned to Baghdad, the baby-milk factory was back in
production.
16
 This even though RAF pilots refused to take part in the carnage that was taking place.
17
 With regard to the first Gulf War, see, in particular, Baudrillard (1995). For a further
interesting and humorous view on these issues, see Castells in discussion with Harry
Kreisler: http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Castells/castells-con4.html
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developed out of what had initially been dubbed 'military technical revolutions'
by Soviel military planners. In the 1970s, Soviel military theorisls idenlified
periods of fundamental change in military affairs, and sought to theorize these
changes. By the early 1980s, Soviel military theorists recognized and began
considering 'the implications for fulure war of lechnological advances in
microelectronics, sensors, precision-guidance, automated control systems, and
directed energy' (Walls 1995). In 1988, Discriminate Deterrence, the American
commission of inquiry on long-term defence slralegy, submitted a report
suggesting amongst other Ihings:
Dramatic developments in military technology appear feasible over the next twenty
years. They will be driven primarily by the further exploitation of microelectronics,
in particular sensors, and information processing, and the development of directed
energy. These developments could require major revisions in military doctrines and
force structures. ... [T]he Soviel military establishment is already engaged in a major
effort to understand the military implications of new technologies, and appears to
have concluded that revolutionary changes in the nature of war will result. The much
greater precision, range, and destructiveness of weapons could extend war across a
much wider geographic area, make war much more rapid and intense, and require
entirely new modes of Operation. (Iklé, Wohlstetter et al. 1988)
Seen in this lighl, parlicularly with its emphasis on IGT, RMA is very much part
and parcel of Ihe process referred lo as globalizalion.18 The work of Ajay Singh
(1995-96), which emphasizes the changes thal have been brought about in whal
he refers lo as the 'Space-Time Paradigm' is particularly relevant here. In
March 1993 the Center for Strategie and Internalional Studies (CSIS) published
a report entitled 'The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework',
in which it was declared that MTR was 'a fundamental advance in technology,
doctrine, or organization that renders existing methods of conducting warfare
obsolete' (cited in Watts 1995: 4). It was with this doctrine in mind Ihal the
United States prepared to wage war in Somalia.
18
 There is a fair amount of literature available on RMA and MTR. However readers
seeking a finely written and strident introduction are directed to read, M.J. Mazarr
(1994), The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning. The
publication can be accessed at:
http://carlislewww.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs94/rma/rma.pdf
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Somalia
'We know you better than you know us.' (Hassan al Tourabi)"
Of late, al hadji Osama Bin Laden has appropriated a substantial amounl of
airtime on the world's various media networks. In his ever-extending fifteen
minules of fame, Bin Laden has been wonl lo slale Ihal events in Somalia
proved to him that the United States of America could be beaten.
The end of the Cold War had serious implications for stales in Africa.2" In Ihe
Horn of Africa, Somalia and Elhiopia were counlries that had vacillaled
between Soviel and US support. In bolh inslances Ihe wilhdrawal of superpower
support for Iheir respective regimes had major implications. Ethiopia came to be
divided into Iwo separate slales, and Somalia collapsed into anarchy. In March
1991, US Assistanl Secretary of Stale Herman Cohen declared Somalia to be a
civil strife disaster, after which the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance began
funding relief efforts there.
Immedialely after the Gulf War, the position of George Bush Sr. as president
of the United States of America appeared unassailable. However, the substantial
public support that Bush had enjoyed evaporated by Ihe middle of 1992. In Ihe
immediale run-up lo Ihe presidenlial campaign, Ihe Bush administration
allempted lo shore up Ihe presidenl's ever worsening posilion. On 14 August
1992, a month prior lo the start of the presidenlial campaign, Ihe Bush
administration turned its atlenlion to Somalia again and ordered a major airlift
of relief supplies (Operation Provide Relief).
Operation Provide Relief, like other attempts to provide relief to Ihe slarving
in Somalia, ground lo a hall and in the absence of a centralized aulhority, relief
workers were unable to transport goods to their inlended deslinalions. In
keeping wilh Ihe logic of a scarce markel, a silualion had developed in Somalia
in which a multilude of armed faclions demanded laxes prior lo allowing the
transportation of food aid through their terrilory. Wilhoul prolection, food
convoys were unable to move and calls for solid and sustained military
Intervention in support of the food convoys were voiced. In November, with Ihe
presidenlial eleclions over, US aid agencies and members of Congress lobbied
lo have the US lake greater action in Somalia. Undoubtedly, George Bush Sr,
who had just been crushingly defealed in the presidential eleclions by Bill
Clinton and had seen his slalure fall from all-conquering world leader to
" Dr Hassan al Tourabi is a graduate of the University of Oxford and the Sorbonne,
founder of the Sudanese National Islamic Front, and a former friend and colleague of
Osama Bin Laden.
'" Regarding the ending of the Cold War and its impact on Africa, see, amongst others,
Akinrinade (1998), Oyebade & Alao (1998) and Furley (1995).
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unpopulär president, saw in the Situation that was developing in Somalia an
opportunity which could allow his presidency to end with a positive flourish,
and ensure his entry into the proverbial history books as a good and benevolent
president.21
To the world's sole superpower, the assorted and factious gunmen scattered
across the former state of Somalia appeared to be a walkover. Having overcome
their Vietnam syndrome in the Gulf War, the United States of America
proceeded to walk slap bang into the Somalia syndrome.
At the end of November 1992, the outgoing Bush administration decided to
commit 28,000 US troops to spearhead an armed Intervention in Somalia in
support of UN relief efforts. On 4 December, the United Nations Security
Council voted to support US intervention, and George Bush went live on
television to address the nation:
There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down. Anarchy
prevails. ... It's now clear that military support is necessary to ensure the safe
delivery of the food Somalis need to survive. ... And so, to every sailor, soldier,
airman, and Marine who is involved in this mission, let me say you're doing God's
work. We will not fail. Thank you, and may God bless the United States of
America."
From the very beginning, Operation Restore Hope was a major media e vent.
Work conducted elsewhere indicates that it was only following Bush's decision
to intervene that media coverage of Somalia truly expanded. In other words,
contrary to voiced opinion, media attention had in itself not been responsible for
the president's decision to intervene (Robinson 2000, 2002). Though printed
media coverage increased substantially, it was specifically in the sphere of live
television coverage that truly absurd situations developed. In the days
immediately after Bush's announccment, media teams from the competing
networks scurried around the various possible landing sites that might be used
by the intervention force. Camera crews, some with portable generators, set up
camp at what appeared to be the most likely landing sites. In the event, the US
Joint Chiefs of Staff did not disappoint the many and varied media concerns. In
the early hours of 9 December 1992, heavily armed US marines and Navy Seals
21
 To be sure there is another far more sinister line of reasoning that relates US
intervention in Somalia to the machinations of Bush and his staff to further support oil
prospecting rights on Somali territory. See 'The Oil Factor in Somalia', an article by
Mark Fineman in the Los Angeles Times, 18 January 1993:
http://www.netnomad.conVfmeman.html
A similar view can be found at: http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2001/msg01143.html
22
 President Bush's address to the nation on 4 December 1992, cited in Robinson (2001).
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landed on the beaches around Mogadishu in a blaze of flashbulbs and live
worldwide television coverage.
Live, real time, those preparing evening meals for their loved ones in New
York City could watch as, halfway round the world, US forces — who were the
epitome of Hollywood's finest soldiers — stormed ashore. In the nights prior to
the US forces' landing, camera crews had anxiously peered out to sea, providing
their worldwide audiences with expansive shots of an empty sea accompanied
by newspeak debating and announcing the imminent arrival of American forces.
When the forces did finally arrive, irate Defence Department spokesmen chided
the media crews for being there, not realizing the apparently precarious and
dangerous nature of their position. If anything, the landing of America's finest
on the shores of Somalia in a blaze of publicity served to emphasize to all
observers the importance of publicity and media in the modern world. Andrew
Purvis, a journalist currently working for Time magazine, recently wrote:
I was on the beach when US troops arrived in Mogadishu in 1992, and the feeling
around me that tempestuous night was a mixture of euphoria and awe. Most Somalis
genuinely welcomed the US deployment, waving as Navy Seals in face paint and
black camouflage waded ashore. They believed the US would help rid them of the
anarchy and famine that had already left tens of thousands dead. AK-47-toting
militiamen in their cloth wraps and rubber sandals were also impressed by the
military show, not knowing what the US colossus was capable of. Within a few
months, all that had changed. (Purvis 2002)
Prior to becoming involved in Somalia, the US National Security Council
commissioned think tanks in the United States to submit reports recommending
what was to be done should the United States choose to intervene in Somalia.
An operational concept plan, 'Military Intervention in Somalia', was drawn up
by Frederick C. Cuny on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and the Center for Naval Analysis, and submitted to the US NSC.23 Apart
from listing recommendations with regard to the operational concept —
Objectives, Force Structure, Security Zones, Exclusion Zones, and so form —
the eleven-point plan included the following fmal paragraph:
The most troublesome element is the likelihood of sniping. There will undoubtedly
be some individuals and possibly groups who will find cause to fire upon US or
allied troops. The terrain outside the city is not suitable for ambushes or sniping; it is
flat and open. The most likely place for sniping will be Mogadishu since it alone
21
 A copy of this report is to be found at:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cuny/laptop/somalia.html.
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offers concealment and escape possibilities. For this reason, it is strongly
recommended that US and allied forces stay out of the city.24
Three days after landing in Somalia, American forces were in combat. From
then onwards, with intermittent periods of relative calm, they became drawn
ever deeper into war. After being initially overawed by the Intervention force,
Somali combatants came to challenge American forces increasingly openly.
Within a month of their arrival, American forces had identified Mohammed
Farah Aidid as their primary opponent. On 12 January 1993, the first marine
was killed whilst on patrol in Mogadishu and from then onwards, slowly but
surely, Somali combatants gained in confidence, and the American forces were
constantly harassed by snipers operating in the city. Time and again, even
though gun ships attacked Somali positions, American forces were subjected to
surprise attacks. Eventually, after seven months of bungling, many wounded
and a number of dead, members of the 3rd Battalion 75th Ranger Regiment and
the lb( Special Forces Operational Detachment (DELTA) were deployed to
Somalia with orders to capture Aidid. In conjunction with this deployment,
Operation Eyes Over Mogadishu was starled. It entailed round-the-clock
surveillance of Mogadishu by Lockheed Orion surveillance planes and
helicopters supported by helicopter gun ships, and helicopter troop carriers.
America's involvement in Somalia was predicated on a positive media
image: American forces guarding food-aid convoys and aiding the starving and
needy. This image changed completely when Wild West 'wanted' posters
bearing Aidid's image appeared throughout Mogadishu.25 In support of these
posters, and in an attempt to minimize American casualties:
The U.S. launched its campaign from the air, using attack helicopters and AC-130
Specter gun ships to carry out what military analysts confidently described to the
world's media as 'surgical' strikes. They were not. In the most notorious incident —
to Somalis, anyway — Cobra gun ships blasted a tall white stucco building in
central Mogadishu in July 1993. The target was a well-publicized meeting of clan
elders loyal to Aidid, but the victims, some 70, included innocent civilians. Word of
the strike spread quickly through Mogadishu's alleyways and coffee houses. When a
24
 The Operational Concept Plan justified its recommendation that American forces
refrain from entering Mogadishu by referring directly to the costly lessons leamt by the
Indian army in its failed operations in Jaffna Town in Sri Lanka, and suggested that,
should Mogadishu be included, the British should be encouraged to 'commit an
experienced force ex Northern Ireland to manage the irregulär urban warfare threat'.
25
 Robert Oakley, US Ambassador to Somalia between November 1992 and May 1993,
noted that the reward of US$25,000 was an insult.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html
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handful of foreign joumalists arrived at the scène, Somalis, mcluding women and
children, turned on them and beat four to death. (Purvis 2002)
The killing of the four western joumalists unleashed a storm of protest in the
West, and must have provided Aidid and his planners with an indication as to
how they could strike back at the 'Lone Ranger'.
But who was Mohammed Farah Aidid, the man so anxiously sought and
vilified by the Americans? Aidid had been a general in the Somali national
army, and as such had enjoyed military training in both the East and the West.2'
In the late 1980s Aidid was instrumental in deposing the Somali dictator
Mohammed Siad Barre and in the ensuing chaos in which Somalia came to be
torn apart, Aidid became president of what remained of Somalia. Even so,
American forces treated him with the utmost contempt, placed a price on his
head and declared him a bandit, a thug and a warlord. To be sure, this view of
Aidid was reinforced every time militiamen allied to Aidid demanded payments
and prevented food convoys from moving through areas under their jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the truth remains that hè was simply dismissed as a serious
opponent, yet hè — more than any other general since Giap — defeated
American forces at their own game.
Aidid was effectively trapped in Mogadishu, yet to all observers it was clear
that the United States was reluctant to commit forces on the ground in the city.
Instead, as was noted above, US forces preferred to attempt to reach their
objectives by pounding their alleged opponents with cannon fire from the air.
Dropping specialized units from helicopters into the city complemented this
strategy. In keeping with Operation Eyes Over Mogadishu, helicopters
continually flew over the city, aircraft that — as Aidid's forces so capably
showed — could be shot down with the simplest of weapons. On 3 October
1993 an American helicopter attempting to 'exfiltrate' an American unit was
shot down by a RPG 7, a simple shoulder-fired rocket-propelled grenade. The
aircraft crashed and was immediately surrounded and attacked by Aidid's
soldiers. When another American helicopter attempted to provide support for
the downed aircraft, it too was shot down, also by an RPG 7. With two of their
aircraft shot down in the city, American forces attempted to reach them
overland but to do so they too had to enter the city — terrain held by Aidid's
forces. American armoured personnel carriers sent into the city ran into
ambushes.27 In this single event, an estimated l ,500 to 2,000 Somalis, including
26
 Mohammed Farrah Aidid's son and successor, Hussein Mohammed Aidid, possessed
American citizenship and returned to Somalia as a US marine in 1992. See:
http://news.bbc,co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_l 146000/1146654.stm.
27
 For a profoundly disturbing view of these events:
http://www.angelfire.com/ne2/somalia/enter.index.html.
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18 US servicemen werenon-combatants, were killed and wounded, whilst
killed and no less than 78 wounded."
American forces had effectively flown, driven and crashed into a terrain in
which all of their high-tech Communications equipment counted for nought.
Citations for 'Medals of Honor', posthumously awarded by the US army to two
of its snipers killed in the events of 3 October, clearly indicate the nature of the
terrain:
When debris and enemy ground fires at the site caused them to abort the first
attempt, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader were inserted one
hundred meters south of the crash site. Equipped with only his sniper rifle and a
pistol, Sergeant First Class Shughart and his team leader, while under intense small
arms fire from the enemy, fought their way through a dense maze of shanties and
shacks to reach the critically injured crew members. Sergeant First Class Shughart
pulled the pilot and the other crew members from the aircraft..."
The pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, survived the engagement but
was captured by Aidid's forces.
Immediately after the battle, on the moraing of 4 October, jubilant Somalis
dragged the body of an American soldier through the streets of Mogadishu.
CNN broadcast these unedited images live to the world. Abdullahi Hassan, who
acted as Aidid's propaganda minister, arranged for CNN to receive a copy of
the video footage of the captured pilot stating: 'Innocent people being killed is
not good'. Durant was held captive for eleven days by Aidid's forces during
which time Abdullahi Hassan allowed the competing media networks access to
Durant and the world received images of a frightened young American being
held captive and being cared for by the followers of Aidid. He told Mark
Huband, a journalist with The Guardian:
Too many innocent people are getting killed. People are angry because they see
civilians getting killed. I don't think anyone who doesn't live here can understand
what is going wrong here. Americans mean well. We did try to help. Things have
gone wrong.
Within a month of Durant's capture, all American servicemen had been
withdrawn from Mogadishu. Aidid had defeated the world's sole superpower
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 Malaysian and Pakistani soldiers assisted the American forces that entered
Mogadishu. Many of them were also killed and wounded. Robert Oakley (US
Ambassador to Somalia) estimated the number of Somali casualties in an interview with
PBS: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/ambush/interviews. See also Hirsch &
Oakley (l995).
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and, as Osama Bin Laden has been happy to point out, Somalia proved that
America could be defeated.
In Somalia, Mohammed Farah Aidid hijacked the weapons of the powerful
and used them for his own aims. The US Intervention in Somalia was
determined and defmed by the media and in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the
US public had come to expect and anticipate clean real-time live images of their
men doing 'God's' work. That this medium could also provide them with real-
time live images of mangled American bodies and frightened captured young
men had not been anticipated, and no amount of spin-doctoring could prevent it.
In Somalia, Aidid took control of, if only for a short period of time, part of the
arsenal of ICT superiority that the US had, and used it against them. Hungry for
their media ratings, international media companies struggled with one another
to scoop the images that would terminale America's involvement in Somalia,
and subsequently Rwanda. Direct real-time images of death and destruction, a
development that had been made possible by the rapid advances in ICT, spread
around the world. From Tokyo to Johannesburg, Sao Paolo, New York and San
Francisco, audiences heard the words and saw the face of the frightened young
pilot urging America to withdraw, and within the space of a month America
withdrew.
There was no longer any support for the US to engage Somalis in combat as far as
the US public was concerned. The impact of Americans being dragged through the
streets, a large number of Americans killed and wounded without any real
explanation by the White House, in advance, of why we were there. The fact that the
mission was no longer a humanitarian mission. That we were somehow engaged in a
war and why this war was worthwhile meant that there was no support whatsoever
for any sort of active Operation, other than self-defense military operations in
Somalia.50
The reaction by the United States to events in Somalia had wide-ranging
repercussions. Bosnian Serbs publicly celebrated developments in Somalia,
secure in the knowledge that they would never have to face US troops in face-
to-face combat (Power 2002). With events in Somalia in mind, Rwandan
extremists planning to commit genocide developed a plan of action that would
guarantee the withdrawal of foreign European troops from Rwanda. On 11
January 1994, Major General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian officer
commanding the United Nations Assistance Mission of Rwanda (UNAMIR)
contacted UN headquarters in New York and transmitted a coded cable via
satellite. The cable proves that by as early as January 1994, the world had
knowledge about the impending genocide. In his cable Dallaire referred to a
' http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html
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Rwandan informant, a 'very very important government politician. ... is a top
level trainer in the cadre of interhamwe'.
He informed us hè was in charge of last Saturday's demonstrations whose aims were
to target deputies of Opposition parties coming to ceremonies and Belgian soldiere.
They hoped to provoke the RPF BN to engage (being fired upon) the demonstrators
and provoke a civil war. Deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit from
Parliament. Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgians soldiers resorted to
force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal
ftom Rwanda."
Hijacking the powerful
Castells has noted that one of the prime constraints on the fighting of wars for
rieh countries is the flow of Information:
It's not just that people no longer feel there are values worth dying for, but their
ability to get information about what's happening on the battlefield is the kind of
Information flow that leaders who want to engage in war have to respond to, and are
therefore forced to get out of the war quickly."
That this is the case has been clearly brought to the fore by what happened in
Somalia and later Rwanda. In both cases, the weapons of the powerful — here
the media — could and can be hijacked for a short period of time and then
released again. This temporary ownership has effects and results that are totally
unintended on the part of the powerful. In and of itself there is nothing new
about the images being presented, yet what is new is the speed, pervasiveness
and quantity of the material being presented. When the Germans were defeated
in battle in Namibia in the late 19lh Century it took at least four months before
the defeat could be avenged, yet when Aidid shot down a helicopter above
Mogadishu, the change was immediate. The example of Somalia indicates that
there is a struggle for access to media streams. It also highlights the need for
further study on how local actors use international media streams to advance
their own aims that is a move away from the anecdotal and a move into the
concrete. In essence, the case of Somalia is a further example of the struggle, on
the part of Africans, to develop ways and means with which to divert and hold,
31
 A copy of this cable is to be found at:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/warning/cable.html.
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 http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Castells/castells-con4.html
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even if for only a limited amount of time, the streams of information and goods
that flow around the globe.
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Can IGT belong in Africa, or is
ICT owned by the North Atlantic
region?
Wim van Binsbergen
ICT, as a technological Innovation and a major factor in
globalization, poses particular problems of ownership and
identity with regard to the African continent. What is the place
of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) in Africa,
and what is the place of Africa in a world increasingly
dominated by ICT? This chapter seeks to explode the apparent
contradiction between Africa and ICT. In the first part the
author confronts African thinkers like Mazrui and Gyekye who
have argued the incompatibility of African culture and ICT.
Hoving advanced an argument to the effect that ICT is just as
much and as little owned by Africans as by any other
collectivity in the contemporary world, the second part of the
chapter sets out, with a more empirical argument, some of the
ways in which the African appropriation of ICT is actually
taking shape.
Introduction: Two worlds?
Until well into the 1970s when computer terminals were still scarce and the
microcomputer unknown, academie computer use in the Netherlands was
mainly restricted to main frames that today we would consider hopelessly
antiquated. Usually we ran our jobs at night, in our absence, as the computer
was slow and the queue of rival jobs was virtually endless. The supreme
' moment came the next morning when we grabbed our batch of output from the
counter assistant who ran the printer to which we had no direct access: The
output consisted of enormous quantities of A3 fanfold paper füll of barely
